Since the Kyoto Agreement, the idea of setting up pollution rights as an instrument of environmental policy for the reduction of greenhouse gases has progressed significantly. But the crucial problem of allocating these permits in a manner acceptable to all countries is still unsolved. There is a general consensus that this should be done according to some proportional allocation rule, but opinions vary greatly about what would be the appropriate proportionality parameter. In this paper, we analyze the economic consequences of different allocation rules in a general equilibrium framework. We first show the existence and unicity of an international equilibrium under the assumption of perfect mobility of capital and we characterize this equilibrium according to the dotations of permits. Then, we compare the economic conesquences of three types of allocation rules when the permit market is designed to reduce total pollution. We show that a rule which applies some form of grandfathering simply reduces production and emissions proportionally and efficiently. In contrast, an allocation rule proportional to population is beneficial for developing countries. Finally per capita allocation rules induce size effect and can reverse these results.
Introduction
One of the most interesting developments in environmental policy in recent years has been the emergence of global environment as a North-South issue. The close link between global environment and development calls for new insights. In a world of global externalities, national policies have important international repercussions through trade and factor mobility. To be sure that the full impact of environmental policies can be analyzed through to its ultimate effects on factor markets, income and pollution, a general equilibrium approach is needed. This is the way pioneered by Copeland and Taylor [1, 2] and Chichinilsky [3] who study the links between trade and environment in a North-South context. Copeland and Taylor [1, 4] , examine linkages between national income, pollution and international trade in a simple model of North-South trade. By isolating the scale, composition and technical effects of international trade on pollution, they show that free trade increases world pollution. Moreover, an increase in the North's production possibilities increases pollution while similar growth in the South lowers pollution. In their papers, pollution has only a local nature, in the sense that damages are confined to the emitting country, and they analyze the same questions with transboundary pollution in Copeland and Taylor [5] where countries differed only in their endowment of efficient labor which is the one primary factor. Chichinilsky [3] , consider two primary factors, physical capital and environmental resource, and focuses mainly on the consequences of differences in property rights on the common-property problem, giving answers to the presumed comparative advantage in "dirty industries" for developing countries or the compatibility of trade policies based on traditional comparative advantages with environmental preservation. In this paper, we adopt the Copeland-Taylor framework with global pollution produced jointly with consumption good, but we introduce international markets for physical capital and pollution permits.
on their practical application (Noll [8] , Hahn [9] , Kete [10] , Hahn and Stavins [11] ). As suggested by Chichinilsky and Heal [12] , tradeable emission permits are also a means to secure the biosphere and Chichinilsky et al. [13] have analyzed their use as a policy instrument against greenhouse warming. They show that the manner in which emission rights are initially distributed determines the possibility of the market attaining a Pareto efficient outcome (Jouvet et al. [14] and Jouvet et al. [15] ).
Since the Kyoto agreement of 1997, the idea of setting up pollution rights as an instrument of environmental policy for the reduction of greenhouse gases has progressed significantly. Europe, which had been hostile to the creation of such an international market for a long time, seems to have converted to this approach. In spite of the advantages which pollution permits seem to possess in comparison to other systems of environmental regulation (Bohm and Russel [16] ), the institutionalizetion of an international market of pollution permits entails several problems (Baumol and Oates [17] Cropper and Oates [18] , Pearce and Turner [19] ). Among these difficulties, the first one to be aware of is without doubt the definition of an environmental norm necessary for the initial issue of permits.
In fact, seemingly intractable problems emerge as soon as we try to establish what would be the appropriate proportionality parameter in order to implement the initial allocation of permits. Opinions vary greatly in this respect and the list of appropriate parameters, which have been actually been put forward in submissions to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, is very large (Müller [20] ). We have mainly the following:  Per capita emission.  Per capita GDP.  Relative historical responsibility.  Land area.  Size of population.
The main question that remains to be solved concerns the economical consequences of those different rules. This question is particularly relevant in the North-South trade context where developing countries are unlikely to participate in the Kyoto agreement expecting that their costs exceed their benefits. For this reason, Bohm and Larsen [21] do not consider developing countries. They evaluate the distributional implications of the reduction costs brought about by various permit allocations in a tradeable permit regime for carbon emissions reductions, for a region consisting of Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). They show that initial permit allocations by population and/or GDP are unlikely to induce the participation of most countries of Eastern Europe and FSU because of the net costs involved. They identify a set of initial allocations that would at least compensate these countries. But their analysis only focuses on the distribution of the economic burden of abatement and misses the general equilibrium implications of the allocation rules. In the same way, Koutstaal [22] focuses on the design, implementation and conesquences of a system of tradeable carbon permits to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the context of the European Union.
In this paper we study an international equilibrium in a two-country model with capital and permit market. We analyze the effects of allocation rules of permits on capital allocation (and consequently on international equilibrium) by considering permit allocation rules proportional to production, emissions, physical capital (in level or per capita) and to population in a general equilibrium framework.
We use the standard technology of production with three factors (capital, labor and emission) in the form proposed by Stokey [23] .
We first analyze the international equilibrium. A permit market does not modify the competitive world equilibrium without permits when the total allocation is large enough. When it is not, there exists a unique equilibrium with under-use of the technology, or with full use of the technology in the two countries.
When allocation of permits is not proportional to the emissions in the world without permits, there is a reducetion factor of emissions which results from the equilibrium allocation of capital. The equilibrium level of use of technology is the same in the two countries. It depends both on the total world dotation of permits and its distribution among countries.
The second and main part of the paper is devoted to studying the economic consequences of different permit allocations rules. Three different types of conclusions hold.
A level allocation rule (proportional to outputs, emissions or physical capital) reduces production and emissions in both countries proportionally with a change in the technology used. In this case, each country uses exactly its dotation of permits and the equilibrium allocation of capital is the same as in the economy without permits. In fact, such an allocation is efficient, i.e. it allows maximum production for a given total world dotation of permits. The level allocation rules proportionally diminish output in the two countries whatever their relative wealth.
A North-South distinction (Copeland and Taylor [1]) assumes higher level of efficient labor per capita in the North. This implies that population allocation rule leads to a North-South ratio of permits smaller than the level allocation. This allocation is beneficial for the developing country, increasing capital and production. Moreover, the South is net seller of permits, which gives him an additional income. However, the per capita income remains lower in the South country than in the North country.
Finally, per capita allocation rules (proportional to per capita output, emissions or physical capital) induce a size effect. If the population in the developing country is lower than the population in the developed country, these rules have the same effects as the population rule. But if it is larger, the developed country benefits from the per capita allocation rules.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 sets up the model. In Section 3 we study the international equilibrium without permits and in Section 4 we state the conditions under which an international equilibrium with permits exists and is unique. Section 5 deals with the economic consequences of different permit allocations rules and Section 6 presents our conclusions.
The Model
We study the international equilibrium for two countries in a simple model with one representative firm in each country. These firms produce the same good with the same technology. We assume perfect mobility of capital but fixed inelastic efficient labor supply in each country and given total capital stock , =1,2 i H i K . We also assume that emissions of pollution is a joint product and we introduce an international market of emissions permits.
Given the quotas , =1,2
for each country, the representative firms can buy or sell it on a permit market, deciding on their emissions as if there was a global world quota. But when the price of permits is positive and there is a reallocation, then the firm's revenues are modified.
Assuming there exists competitive labor market in each country, wage corresponds to the marginal productivity of labor and the firm's revenue net of wages includes the net benefit of the permit market. As a conesquence, the rate of return of capital is different from the marginal productivity of capital, as soon as there are transactions on the permit market.
With perfect mobility of capital across countries, only the average returns to capital are equalized to the marginal productivities. Indeed, the permit market modify the net revenue of the firms and thus their value. As a consequence, the equilibrium with perfect mobility of capital will lead to equalizing the values of capital that take into account the net gains on the permit market.
The Technology
Two countries produce the same good with the same Cobb-Douglas production technology given by
where i K and i are respectively capital and efficient labor, and i an index of the technology used with
is the potential output.
The ratio emission on production is an increasing function of = , >0
, the use of all productive possibility leads to the largest emissions and pollution.
Remark 1. This one-good model (see Stokey [23] ) can be interpreted as a reduced form of the framework in Copeland and Taylor [1] . In fact, it is equivalent to the following three factor production function
is homogenous of degree one, continuous and concave with respect to capital, labor and emissions. It is differentiable except at the points at which .
Firm's Behavior
In each country , a representative firm maximize profits with respect to the use of technology i , efficient labor and capital stock i K In addition, firm in country hold a given stock of permits
This initial allocation is different from i the firm's demand, which depend of the market price of the permit on the international market.
Denote by i the wage in country . The revenue, including the net gains on the permit market is thus given by
Using relation (2), the problem of firm in country is
The first order conditions are
This last condition gives
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Efficient labor is paid at its marginal productivity according to (4) . Decision on the use of technology only depends on the price of permits. Hence, in the two countries the index of the technology used is the same, . Thus profits satisfy
As long as the price of permits is low enough, i.e.
, in the two countries, the production is equal to its potential output which leads to maximum pollution in the two countries. But, as soon as the price of permits exceeds
, the index of technology used is less than one which implies a reduction in production and thus in pollution.
Note that pollution is reduced in two ways : emissions decrease both with production and the index of technology used (Equation (2)). Following Hahn and Solow [24] (pages 70-71) "...we take it to be characteristic of capitalist firms that their profits go to the suppliers of capital. We assume, therefore, that savings...are used to buy shares in the gross operating surplus of firms." Therefore the total return per unit of capital, , is defined by
This implies that
This net revenue i is similar to the gross operating surplus defined by Hahn and Solow. Note that when the price of permits is positive, the permit market modify the firm's income and so the return of capital which is not equal to its marginal productivity.
According to the price of permits, two cases occur :
Equilibrium
In the absence of mobility of labor, in each country, the equilibrium in the labor market implies the equality of the labor demand and the supply
In the world without permits, the definition of the equilibrium is standard. It is efficient and gives the maximum of the world production.
This maximum is obtained when the allocation of total capital 1
is proportional to efficient labor and this leads to the potential world output,
The corresponding total emissions is then also maximum:
Emissions are proportional to efficient labor 2 2 2
with the allocation of permits ,
, there is an additional market and we denote  the equilibrium price on this market. In addition, this market interact with the capital market. The assumption of perfect mobility of capital leads to equality of the two rates of return which implies
Finally, the permit market clears, which means 1 2 1 2 with equality if > 0
At equilibrium, emissions are 
More generally, when the sum of the allocation of permits is at least equal to the maximum of emissions the equilibrium price of permits is zero, total production is equal to potential world output. This holds if
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World Equilibrium with Reduction of Emissions
When the total dotation of permits does not allow for the maximum of pollution, i.e.
The following study shows the existence of a unique equilibrium, either with under-use of the technology or with full use of the technology in the two countries.
This second possibility occurs when the allocation of permits is not proportional to the emissions in the world without permits. There is then a reduction factor of emissions which results from the equilibrium allocation of capital.
The equilibrium level of use of technology is the same in the two countries. It depends both on the total world dotation of permits and its distribution among countries.
Equilibrium with Under-Use of Potential Outputs
We begin with some useful concepts in order to study the existence of an equilibrium with under-use of potential outputs. Since the allocation of factors are not proportional, then the sum of potential outputs 1 2 is smaller than the world potential output and we have
where  is a reduction factor smaller than 1.
At the equilibrium, this reduction factor is a function of the equilibrium ratio: e   More precisely, the larger the gap between e and  , the smaller the reduction factor at equilibrium.
Equilibrium: Given 1 E and 2 , the equilibrium index of technology used 
Equilibrium with Full Use of Potential Outputs
With full use of potential outputs and positive price of permits we have and
In the proportional case,   = e  , at equilibrium there is no transactions on the permit's market.
In the particular case where In the intermediate case,
, there is full use of potential outputs but it remains a reduction factor which is smaller than 1 and larger than To summarize, we obtain :
Proposition 2. Assume that allocation of permits is not proportional to efficient labor and total allocation is below the maximum of pollution. Then, there exists a minimum level of total allocation for which the world equilibrium uses potential outputs and the price of permits is positive.
Again, the equilibrium ratio of emissions is located between the ratio of efficient labor  and the ratio of plane, we have drawn regions corresponding to the different equilibria. In region A, total dotation of permits is at least equal to the maximum of emissions and (Proposition 1), in region B total dotation of permits is smaller than the product of maximum of emissions with the reduction factor and there is 
Figure 1. Regions corresponding to different types of equilibrium.
under-use of potential output (Proposition 2), and in region C there is full use of potential output and the price of permits is positive (Proposition 3).
The Economic Consequences of Allocation Rules of Permits
In order to study the consequences of different allocation rules of permits, we compare the equilibrium with permits to the equilibrium without permits. Without permits, the equilibrium values of capital stocks E . H Profits per unit of capital are equal in the two countries (perfect mobility of capital) and equal to the marginal productivity of capital. As shown in Section 3, the equilibrium with permits coincides with the equilibrium without permits when the total dotation of permits allow for the potential world output, i.e.
  E E b K
and pollution is maximum in this case:
This is our benchmark case defined by 
We assume now that the total dotation of permits does not allow for the maximum of pollution, i.e.
and we consider three types of allocation rules.
Level Allocation Rules
The proportionality at the equilibrium without permits of capital, output, emissions and efficient labor (Equation (18)) implies that any allocation of permits proportional to one of these levels, leads to the same allocation which we call the level allocation rules. These rules can be viewed as some form of grandfathering 3 . All these rules 
 is the potential production in country . The maximum of subject to
This results from the concavity of the problem and the maximization on the Lagrangian
As a consequence, the maximum of world production can be formulated as follow: Maximize with respect to
and K , with
, this leads to ma- 
. i
We h that for any allocati l We assume that country 2 is a developing country because it has a lower efficient labor per capita untry 1, say a developed country.
Then an allocation rule proportiona to population implies
We compare the effects of this rule of allocation to the preceding rule proportional to  , with the same dotation of permits
When e   , the equilibrium reduction factor  is smaller than 1 are two possibilit and there ies for the equilibrium according to if E is larger or smaller than
If the equilibrium reduction factor is not too low is decreasing with respect to e , for > e  and admits a finite limit   when e tends  to  (Appendix A1, Lemma 11). Thus
and the international equilib- 
World production is reduced because its maximum for given K and E is reached at the equilibrium with allocation = .
e  The capital rat o i
is the same:
and K . The increase in z and 2 K implies an increase ry 2.
 
in producti for count on
This also implies an in ns crease in emissio Clearly, the a rule proportional to population is in favor of the developing country increasing ca d production. An additional advantage is the income from selling permits.
The situation of the developed country is the complete opposite: it looses in e reduced and it must buy more permits. We should also remark that production per capita remains larger in the developed country when 
The ratio of total income is
implies that per capita income in the developing country is smaller than in the developed country. □ allocation of perputs, emissions or  which
Per Capita Allocation Rules
Per capita allocation rules lead to an mits proportional to per capita out physical capital.
We note  the ratio of population fications. This is to say that now, the developing country is a net buyer of p its less pollution. In this case, per capita allocation rules are in unfavor of the developing cou
Conclusions
The Second Assessm [26] ), contains the et al.
nomic effects of two allocation rules, the grandfathering rule and the population rule. Developed countries would be net beneficiaries if should quotas grandfathering be adopted and under the population allocation rule the net beneficiaries would be the developing countries.
Our analysis allows us to be more specific on the economic consequences of these different allocatio e level allocation rules (which include the grandfathering rule) are efficient and lead to maximum world output once total emissions are given. They imply proportional reduction of pollution in all countries and have no effect on international capital allocation, under the assumption of the same technology in all countries.
The population allocation rule confirms the benefits for developing countries in every respects: production, ovement of capital and income from the permit market. Nevertheless, per capita income remains lower in the developing country.
Per capita allocation rules have different size effects, depending on the rati ith the same level of population, the per capita rules lead to the efficiency allocation, and thus performs exactly like the level allocations rules. With a different level of population, the developing country benefits if and only if it has a lower level of population than in the developed country which benefits in the opposite case.
Our results shed some light on the recurrent discussion between countries about the initial distribution of permits a tradeable market. Regarding efficiency, the level allocation rules seems to be the best. But it does not allow for any evolution of the relative income between countries. This shows that this allocation should be linked to redistribution policies. Further research will analyze the welfare effect of the abatement of pollution and the allocation rule. 
 The equilibrium condition (14) on the permit market with > 0 q implies 
